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LIBERALISM, REPUBLICANISM AND THE
ABORTION CONTROVERSY
GARY C. LEEDES*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HIS article considers the abortion controversy in the context
of intellectual history and political theory. It does not ana-
lyze the Supreme Court's recent abortion cases,' rely upon formal
legal reasoning, or predict how the Court will decide any cases
currently pending on its docket. Instead, it examines the Court's
current options in light of the intersecting and pliable traditions
of liberalism and republicanism.
Liberalism consists of a bevy of imprecise doctrines which
justify an occasionally shifting group of individual rights, a broad
range of political liberties and a narrow charter for government.
The American version of liberalism guarantees inter alia freedom
of thought, religion and expression and protects individuals from
various forms of invidious discrimination. A liberal society is, in
Karl Popper's phrase, an open society.2 American proponents of
liberalism regard most laws based upon conventional morality as
oppressive. Liberals claim that "it is prima facie a good thing for
human beings to have, to act on, and to satisfy desires and inter-
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond, The T.C. Williams School of
Law. B.S.E. 1960, University of Pennsylvania; L.L.B. 1962, Temple University;
L.L.M. 1973, Harvard University; SJ.D. 1983, Harvard University.
The author expresses his gratitude to Professors Mary Ann Glendon, Kent
Greenawalt, J.P. Jones, Kenneth Karst, Michael Perry, Robert Post, Rodney
Smolla and Mark Tushnet whose critiques reduced the number of errors and
oversimplifications in this article.
1. The 1988 term will always be remembered for the Court's decision in
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, Inc. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion). In Webster, Justice Blackmun described the Court's plurality opinion as a
"proposed revolutionary revision in the law of abortion." Id. at 3079 (Black-
mun,J., concurring and dissenting in part). The Court continued to revise abor-
tion law in its 1990 term. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 58 U.S.L.W. 495 (U.S.June
25, 1990) (upholding Minnesota parental consent statute); Ohio v. Akron
Center for Reproductive Health, 58 U.S.L.W. 4979 (U.S. June 25, 1990) (up-
holding Ohio statute requiring physician to notify parent prior to performing
abortion on minor child).
2. Sir Karl Popper wrote that "an open society.., rejects the absolute au-
thority of the merely established and merely traditional . K. POPPER, THE
OPEN SOCIETv AND ITS ENEMIES viii (1963)
(571)
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ests. ' 3 Contemporary liberals rally behind Roe v. Wade4 and ar-
gue that the public interest in potential life is not more important
than a woman's reproductive freedom.
A deferential republican counter-argument is more support-
ive of a community's assessment of the moral and legal status of
the fetus than a woman's freedom. 5 The republican vision of de-
mocracy is less individualistic than the liberal vision. Although
republicanism is consistent with an activist judiciary that guards
against democratic excesses contrary to public virtue, prior to the
twentieth century it was unthinkable for a federal court to strike
down laws which embodied the local community's moral stan-
dards. 6 Contemporary liberals, however, reject any accommodat-
ing judicial philosophy that ranks the moral judgments of the
community above "privacy" rights recently discovered in the
Constitution. Liberals deny that "the common good" is a useful
conception to courts. They reject the republican assumption that
a legislative majority is capable of identifying the hypothesized
common good. Liberals also worry that a consensus of ideas
about public virtue leads to intolerance, orthodoxy, and repres-
sion. When liberals reject the community consensus, however,
how is the judicial activist supposed to rank competing liberal
value judgments?
The questions presented by the abortion controversy include
the following: Under what conditions are non-therapeutic abor-
tions tolerable? What is the role of the Supreme Court when a
state's abortion control law mirrors the moral standards of its citi-
zens? Should conventional ethics and communal morality be ex-
pressed in criminal laws imposing penalties for abortion? Does
3. R. FLATHAM, TOWARD A LIBERALISM 124 (1989).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. Deferential republican communitarians must be sharply contrasted with
the communitarians who are liberal, egalitarian judicial activists. See, e.g., R.
DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 167-68, 195, 211-13 (1986). The theories of thesejudi-
cial activists, not discussed in this article, have been criticized cogently. See
Kahn, Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1 (1989) (ques-
tioning usefulness of communitarian model due to contradictions in model's
assumptions).
6. The representatives elected to the legislature are servants of the people
with authority, within limits, to act on behalf of the people. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 78, at 506 (A. Hamilton) (E. Earle ed. 1937). Legislators, more so than
judges, are likely to be attuned to the community's will. It is awkward for judges
to assert that the legislature's assessment of enduring community values is mis-
taken. Moreover, although a social consensus may depart from ideals of republi-
can civic virtue, jurists have not developed an adequate philosophy of judicial
activism based on civic virtue. Judges are intermediaries between the people
and their representatives. Judges are not cultural czars.
[Vol. 35: p. 571
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the right to abortion ever depend on the motives of a woman and
the specific circumstances of her pregnancy? What is the moral
status and significance of the fetus during various stages of fetal
development? These questions present perplexing metaphysical,
political and legal issues. The answers to these questions divide
people with strong moral claims into pro-choice and pro-life
factions.
The Supreme Court's task during the 1990s will be to strike a
delicate balance between the woman's interest in reproductive
freedom and each state's interest in enacting laws that embody
competing social norms. It is impossible to balance these incom-
mensurable interests according to value-neutral conceptions of
justice. The Court, in its attempt to weigh competing interests, is
affected in subtle, but profound ways by individualistic and com-
munalist conceptions of political morality.
When the Court decided Roe v. Wade, the individualistic lib-
eral conception was selected as normatively preferable. The
Court's opinion identified an enclave of privacy that was broad
enough to protect women desiring abortions from virtually all ex-
isting legislation. 7 Even a cursory reading of Roe indicates that
republican conceptions of civic virtue were rejected as irrelevant
or comparatively unimportant. As the boundaries of the right to
reproductive freedom are reconsidered in the 1990s, many liber-
als will continue to maintain that a pregnant woman is not in the
same moral category as a fetus because a woman is "a thinking,
judging, feeling, hoping, believing human person who suffers in a
here and now that may last much of her life." 8 A human fetus
lacks several traits which many liberals consider central to per-
sonhood. It "does not have hopes that can be dashed, expecta-
tions that can be disappointed, desires that can be frustrated,
objectives that it can fail to attain." 9 In effect, a fetus is banished
from the moral community of liberals-most of whom are moti-
vated by a benign desire to reduce suffering. Liberals argue that
to deny women a legal right to abortion is "to condemn very large
numbers of actual human persons to pain and anguish . . . 0
Liberals contend that abortion control laws perpetuate sys-
7. In Roe, the Court held that the fourteenth amendment concept of per-
sonal liberty affords constitutional protection against state interference with an
individual's personal privacy, including a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
8. R. FLATHAM, supra note 3, at 196.
9. Id. at 191.
10. Id. at 196.
5731990]
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tems of oppression that treat women as second-class citizens.
Liberals are most persuasive when they take an anti-totalitarian
stance and explain how mandatory childbearing, as a result of leg-
islation prohibiting abortions, unjustly transforms a woman's
body into an instrument of state policy. This anti-totalitarian ar-
gument is not based simply on the claim that a pregnant woman's
body belongs solely to her, but also upon the extent to which her
reasonable expectations of personal autonomy can be crushed by
mandatory childbearing requirements." In some situations, a
woman's identity as an individual is so traumatically affected by
pregnancy that the scope of her constitutionally protected repro-
ductive freedom determines her survival.' 2
When a state forces a woman to bear and raise an unwanted
child, especially when she cannot financially afford to fulfill paren-
tal responsibilities, her future is dictated by many severe circum-
stances beyond her control, at least until the child reaches the age
of emancipation. What is often at stake is a woman's power to
plan her life. In such cases, equal protection principles protect
women who demonstrate that they are not similarly situated to
others, yet subjected to the same statutory prohibition and crimi-
nal penalty. Women want to escape the forces that interfere with
their rational plans for self-development as independent persons
with opportunities equal to men. Escape is cut off when laws re-
quire women to abandon the abortion option.
In controversies over abortion, pro-choice liberals deny they
are for abortion. They explain that they are against the subjuga-
tion and victimization of women whose basic needs should be sat-
isfied regardless of a community's outmoded habits of thought.' 3
The fear of mandatory childbearing interferes with many impor-
tant relationships, including sexual relationships. Justice Bren-
11. See Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 739-40, 788-
91 (1989) (difficult to imagine a "single proscription with a greater capacity to
shape lives into singular, normalized, functional molds than the prohibition of
abortions"); see also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1515 (1988) ("A
more promising theme in equal protection doctrine may well be an antisubjuga-
tion principle, which aims to break down legally created or legally reenforced
systems of subordination that treat some people as second-class citizens.").
12. See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 71-75 (1982); see also L. TRIBE,
supra note 11, at 1340 ("[I]t is difficult to imagine a clearer case of bodily intru-
sion [than prohibiting abortion] .... ").
13. B. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW
AGE 7 (1984). "It is not surprising that liberals, who regard political community
as instrumental rather than as an intrinsic good ... [aim] to contain power and
community and to judge [laws] by how they affect freedom and private interest."
Id.
[Vol. 35: p. 571
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nan, who claims we often cannot agree on the definition of the
"good life," explains that "liberty" in a pluralistic "community
such as ours . . . must include the freedom not to conform" to
customs and usages embodied in state law.' 4
Critics who read anomic implications injustice Brennan's re-
markable dictum argue that human freedom cannot be achieved
unless there are enforceable laws that abridge some desired liber-
ties. Socially integrated human beings renounce many desires,
including the desire to disobey law. In any society, the repression
of desires is an essential consequence as well as precondition of
civilization. Critics of Justice Brennan's liberalism see the disso-
lution of morality as a sword of Damocles hanging over us-a
sword which could fall if the political state does not enforce laws
embodying social norms which restrict morally repugnant behav-
ior. The dissolution of the state itself usually accompanies the
breakdown of its moral structure. Now thatJustice Brennan is no
longer on the Court, his replacement will consider whether a state
may perpetuate a moral structure that is too rigid for non-con-
forming individuals desiring an abortion.
Admittedly, in a pluralistic nation, we have many different
conceptions of morality. Although each state law and each wo-
man's situation is different, Roe v. Wade does not permit legisla-
tures to enact laws which mirror the conventions, customs,
venerated traditions and deeply rooted moral sentiments of polit-
ical majorities trying to reduce the number of abortions. The
Court, after peering into the Constitution, found viability as the
appropriate line where compelling state interests begin.' 5 What
is now needed, however, is not a new arbitrary line, but an equita-
ble compromise in each state where abortion battle lines are
drawn. An equitable compromise is one that respects the needs
of women but does not denigrate the value of developing human
life.
Since the morality of abortion depends on a compromise
which may vary from state to state,' 6 it is arguable that some de-
14. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2351 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Michael H. claimed that he was the father of a
child born to a married woman who was not his wife. Under California law,
because the child's mother was living with her husband, and the husband was
neither sterile or impotent, the offspring was presumed to be the child of the
marriage. The Court upheld the statute over Justice Brennan's objection that it
"squashes" liberties protected by the Constitution including the freedom not to
conform. Id. at 2351.
15. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 ("compelling point" at end of first trimester).
16. See Waldron, Particular Values and Critical Morality, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 561,
1990] 575
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centralization of decision-making authority is appropriate. Even
the states are not suitable political subdivisions. They are too
large and contain a variety of moral communities. Decentraliza-
tion would allow local communities to limit abortion on demand
in states where there are not any abortion control laws. There-
fore, local communities need more "home rule" so that they can
create zones of reproductive freedom if state legislation prohibits
abortions. Decentralization also entails a more limited role for
the federal courts. Indeed, if Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,
Inc. 17 foreshadows a return to federalism and judicial restraint,
the role of federal judges will be comparatively modest. They will
simply determine whether a reasonable legislative compromise vi-
olates equal protection standards or falls below the traditional
minimum essentials of ordered liberty.
The concept of traditional ordered liberty depends on the
Court's understanding of people's enduring basic rights and re-
sponsibilities. The post-Webster debates indicate that Americans
in different localities think and act differently on issues of crucial
importance to women. Public opinion polls show that the vast
majority of Americans want women to have adequate reproduc-
tive freedom, but many people (male and female) are opposed to
abortion on demand, absent exigent circumstances.' 8
The constitutionalized right of abortion is still too new to be
described as an enduring basic right which outweighs all state in-
terests in morality. The American tradition of legal moralism has
a stronger historical basis than recently recognized rights of pri-
vacy.19 Webster invites the public to reconsider whether abortion
rights should be trimmed down to accommodate a reflective con-
sensus about the zone of a woman's protected privacy. Many
strong-willed Americans might accept an equitable compromise
after they understand that their opposite numbers are willing to
make some concessions. The ongoing political debate can either
further divide us or deepen us as a thoughtful people. As the
people and the judiciary decide whether a woman may choose to
574 (1989) ("different communities require different things of their members in
the way of civility, decency, and morality").
17. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (plurality opinion).
18. In the CBS News New York Times Poll of September 20, 1989, 43% of
those polled said that abortion should be "legal as it is now," 40% wanted it
legal "only in cases such as rape, incest or to save the life of the mother," and
13% said they would never permit abortion. See Ladd, Abortion Issue Remains an
Even Split, Richmond News Leader, Nov. 30, 1989, at 18, col. 1.
19. For a discussion of legal moralism, see infra notes 21-46 and accompa-
nying text.
[Vol. 35: p. 571576
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exclude a fetus from the community, 20 we are passing judgment
on ourselves and history will pass judgment upon us.
A political compromise, by definition, cannot fully satisfy
only one set of rigid principles. Whenever a legislative compro-
mise is proposed, it inevitably encounters the liberals' resistance
to the idea that restrictive laws help society maintain a decent
moral environment. But should courts give more weight to the
principles of liberalism over competing republican communitar-
ian principles? The question cannot be answered fully without a
consideration of the political position of legal moralism.
II. THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF LEGAL MORALISM
Legal moralism is a manifestation of republicanism in com-
munities in which majorities vote for criminal laws punishing be-
havior deemed immoral and intolerable. It is a political position
abhorred by many liberals because it signifies that individuals in
society do not have adequate freedom to behave as they please. 2'
Legal moralists remind us that freedom depends on laws limiting
some liberties: labor laws, anti-discrimination laws, minimum
wage laws and laws protecting the environment. Liberals and
republicans, if they are realistic, understand that law constrains
the freedom of some so that others may have a degree of freedom
they would not otherwise have. The legal moralist views the com-
munity as an organism in which every malfunctioning part is a
threat to its capacity to function at an acceptable qualitative
20. See K. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION 190 (1989). Kenneth Karst wrote, "What makes a community is
not merely birth or place or values or interests but a state of mind and feeling,
the common perceptions of a number of individuals that they are linked in ways
that give emotional content to the word we." Id.
Ronald Dworkin argues that judicial review is necessary to check political
majorities that do not consider the interests of all the groups in the community.
Dworkin, at best, is a half-hearted communitarian; he wants to exclude decisions
about the good life from politics in order to be true to the liberal principle of
treating, as equals, those whom he recognizes as human beings. Dworkin, What
Liberalism Isn't, N.Y. Rev. Books Jan. 20, 1983, at 47, 50; see also R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 125-30 (1977) (supporting Roe v. Wade). Dworkin is
concerned with women as members of the community. He does not include the
fetus as a right-holding member of the community. Dworkin, The Future of Abor-
tion, N.Y. Rev. Books, Sept. 8, 1989, at 51.
21. A society ideally refers to a group of interdependent human beings
working together for the satisfaction of their wants and collective needs. Legal
moralists often treat society as if it were as real as individuals, whereas liberals
frequently treat individuals as if they are abstractions not dependent on others
in society. R. BELLAH, R. MADSEN, W. SULLIVAN & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE
HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 334 (1985) [herein-
after R. BELLAH].
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Arguably, individuals who need each other for their mutual
benefit should not be permitted to act as entirely self-governing
entities.23 Even in morally pluralistic communities, the individual
is not completely separated from other members of the political
community who insist upon a substantial degree of conforming
behavior. Legal moralists do not accept the idea of a radical sepa-
ration between individuals and their community. The never end-
ing debates about legal moralism and the morality of abortion
now challenge many state legislatures to wrestle with the tension
between permissive liberal individualism and a communalist con-
ception of morality. 24 Some of the following questions, not men-
tioned earlier, are extremely pertinent for state legislatures and
courts:25 Does liberalism unrealistically demote the intellect by
making it the instrument of desire? How is liberalism's emphasis
on individualism, rights, tolerance, and permissiveness related to
the success of demagogues who exploit social anomie?2 6 How
22. For a thorough discussion of the tenets of legal moralism, see Sympo-
sium: Law, Community, and Moral Reasoning, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1989).
23. See H. LASKI, THE STATE: IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 9 (1935). "[I]t is by
the possession of sovereignty that the state is distinguished from all other forms
of human association." Id. The sovereign state "possess[es] a coercive author-
ity legally supreme over any individual or group which is part of the society." Id.
at 8.
Coercion is necessary because "the freedom of some must at times be cur-
tailed to secure the freedom of others." I. BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 126
(1970); see alsoJ. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 94 (1931); M. COHEN, REA-
SON AND LAW 7 (1950) ("No integrated social action is possible without some
adjustment among the different elements that co-operate."); S. HooK, PHILOSO-
PHY AND PUBLIC POLICY 20 (1980) ("[W]e cannot be free unless others are unfree
to interfere with our freedom.").
24. One commentator sees the debate as one involving the individual's re-
lationship with the community. He explains that the relationship is dialectical.
Neither term (community nor individual) is comprehensible without the other:
"the community is a community of individuals, whose own identities are insepa-
rable from their social involvements." Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985
Term-Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 32 (1986).
25. Another question is suggested by John R. Silber's argument that the
abortion issue is one "that cries out for toleration because there is so much bit-
ter debate and confusion between legal issues and moral ones, between religious
issues and political ones." Silber, Don't Roll Back 'Roe' N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1990
at A19, col. 1.
But is the issue of abortion one that cries out for toleration or one that
requires a continuing dialogue that generates different legislative compromises
in different states?
26. See H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 478 (1973). Arendt
writes that men are prepared for totalitarian exploitation when they become so
lonely that they are ready for any "escape from this reality." They are captured
by the "mighty tentacle" of totalitarian rhetoric that "appears like a last support
in a world where nobody is reliable and nothing can be relied upon." Id.
8
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much moral relativism can our society tolerate? 27 What kinds of
private behavior undermine a community's commitment to rais-
ing children? Are criminal sanctions ever appropriate to punish
behavior considered ethically repugnant if, as in the abortion con-
troversy, there is an absence of an independent ground for moral
judgment? To what extent are abortion-control laws motivated
by religious considerations that detract from the rationality of leg-
islative judgments?
These questions pose many difficulties. For example, if a leg-
islature demands penal sanctions28 in order to influence the be-
havior of women considering abortion, Roe v. Wade still remains
an obstacle.29 Roe embraced many tenets of liberalism that are
critical of legal moralism. Justice Blackmun regarded the ques-
tionable moral status of the fetus as a factor tending to complicate
the abortion question.30 His Roe opinion was criticized, however,
because it was not based upon principles either deeply rooted in
the community3' or evidently designated by the text of the Con-
stitution.3 2 The Webster decision reopened the door through
which legal moralism may enter since states "now appear to have
some unknown degree of additional power to control the inci-
dents of abortion."3 3
27. Although toleration in itself is not necessarily action producing harm, it
often permits harm to be done. For example, the toleration of offensive speech
permits the infliction of psychological trauma. See Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408
U.S. 901, 903 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
28. See Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 479 (1989). Dworkin
argues that the changes in a person's behavior, if induced by criminal sanctions,
"corrupt[s] rather than enhance[s] critical judgment," because conformity with
the community's moral standards solely because of threats of punishment can
hardly be counted as genuine. Id. at 486.
29. See R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAw 116 (1990) (calling Roe "the greatest example and symbol of the judi-
cial usurpation of democratic prerogatives in this century").
30. Roe, 410 U.S. at 161 ("There has always been strong support for the
view that life does not begin until live birth .... [T]he law has been reluctant to
endorse any theory that life as we recognize it, begins before live birth or to
accord legal rights to the unborn ....").
31. See, e.g., A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN Gov-
ERNMENT 114 (1976).
32. See R. BORK, supra note 29, at 114-15.
33. Id. at 116. In Webster, Justices Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy em-
ployed a "standard of review which necessarily, though not explicitly, com-
pletely overrules Roe." Id. Justice Scalia is prepared to overrule Roe. Justice
O'Connor favors an approach that might invalidate state legislation that is "un-
duly burdensome" on the right to seek an abortion. See, e.g., Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 749 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 should
not be subject to heightened judicial review since provisions of Act do not im-
pose "undue burden" on abortion decision); Akron v. Akron Center for Repro-
1990] 579
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Communitarians in favor of legal moralism claim that liberals
draw too "sharp [a] distinction between [their] own.., well-being
and the well-being of the political community to which they be-
long." 34 Belonging to the community entails responsibilities and
obligations. Communitarians call attention to the numerous so-
cial benefits provided by communities. Among the benefits are
priceless interpersonal relationships. Indeed, a sense of belong-
ing provides individuals with an identity, loyalties and attach-
ments without which they feel empty, alone and adrift. One
argument for legal moralism is that too much tolerance of non-
conforming behavior makes the community ineffective in its role
of serving the material, kinship and intellectual needs of individu-
als.35 Another argument insists that individuals who derive bene-
fits from the community have a responsibility to conform to
reasonable legislative judgments, so long as laws do not unduly
interfere with their liberty.
When political issues are debated in a legislature, vigorous
verbal conflict is used as a means to achieve compromise. 36 The
non-violent conflicts are sometimes carried to the courts. The
Supreme Court can assert its authority to end the political strug-
gle when fundamental rights are abridged. The abortion debate,
however, was not ended by Roe because so many people were
shocked to learn that abortion is a fundamental constitutional
right.
Viewing abortion as a fundamental constitutional right 37
sends a message that an elective abortion is acceptable behavior
anytime an unwanted offspring threatens a woman's plans; in fact,
many people believe that some of the Court's post-Roe decisions
endorse abortion as a means of birth control. If a legislative com-
ductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 463 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The
'unduly burdensome' standard is particularly appropriate in the abortion con-
text because of the nature and scope of the right that is involved."). Justice
O'Connor believes that "the State possesses compelling interests in the protec-
tion of potential human life and in maternal health throughout pregnancy, [and]
not every regulation that the State imposes must be ...examined with strict
scrutiny." Akron, 462 U.S. at 461. Nevertheless, she is opposed to any "imposi-
tion of an 'absolute obstacle' on the [woman's] abortion decision." Id.
34. Dworkin, supra note 28, at 491.
35. Id. at 487.
36. B. BARBER, supra note 13, at 162.
37. See M. GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 24 (1987)
("The U.S. Supreme Court ... after some initial equivocation in Roe v. Wade now
speaks routinely of a constitutional right to abortion."). But see Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977) ("Roe did not declare an unqualified 'constitutional
right to abortion.' ").
[Vol. 35: p. 571
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promise is negotiated after a heated exchange of opposing opin-
ions, the legislature's justification is rarely free of problematic
presuppositions. If the justification involves a fundamental right,
it rarely survives strict scrutiny. Unintended messages are often
sent by judges when they invalidate legislation that does not sur-
vive strict scrutiny. Indeed, according to deferential republicans,
the Court's strictest level of intensified scrutiny is too demanding.
A legislative compromise on abortion control is usually not
the product of impeccable logic. Therefore, a legal brief defend-
ing such a compromise will always have some weak links. Courts
should not ordinarily place excessive emphasis upon the weakest
link in an advocate's chain of reasoning.38 Instead, in the spirit of
legal moralism, courts should ascertain whether the legislature
has woven together many strands of public opinion to represent a
coming together of reasonable people who have reflectively con-
sidered each other's counter-arguments.
Professor Mary Ann Glendon condones legal moralism in the
area of abortion rights. She believes that courts should avoid un-
dermining local communities where values are "established,
maintained and transformed. '" 3 9 She has compared Roe and its
progeny with the approaches of lawmakers and courts in nineteen
other countries. She points out that the United States Supreme
Court's position curtails legislatures more severely than any other
Western nation. 40 Glendon suggests that greater judicial defer-
ence to state legislatures is "desirable, because the legislative pro-
cess, however imperfect, is a major way in which we as a society
try to imagine the right way to live."' 4 ' Legislative compromises,
which bring political enemies together, keep the peace and are
indispensable in any civilized human society.
Glendon observes that reasonable legislative compromises
have been upheld by courts in many nations that "have been just
38. See B. BARBER, supra note 13, at 163. Benjamin Barber quotes Charles
Sanders Peirce who wrote, " 'Reasoning should not form a chain which is no
stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so slender,
provided that they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected.' " Id.
39. See M. GLENDON, supra note 37, at 8 (citing White, Law as Rhetoric, Rheto-
ric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 684 (1985)).
40. Id. at 2 ("[W]e have less regulation of abortion in the interest of the
fetus than any other Western nation ...."). Glendon's argument has been chal-
lenged as factually inadequate by an international women's health organization.
See Brief of Amici Curiae International Women's Health Organization in Sup-
port of Appellees at 2-20, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, Inc., 109 S.
Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605).
41. M. GLENDON, supra note 37, at 62.
1990]
11
Leedes: Liberalism, Republicanism and the Abortion Controversy
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
as deeply divided as ours, if not more so, on the abortion ques-
tion ... "42 Glendon's comparative analysis demonstrates that
compromises can be carefully worked out to decide matters of
common concern, notwithstanding profound differences of opin-
ion.43 Glendon concludes that the United States Supreme Court
fails to understand that many thoughtful Americans do not want
non-elected judges "to confer upon others, a fundamental right
to dispose of developing life." 44 She favors judicial opinions that
leave abortion regulation primarily up to the state legislatures. 45
She also observes that the intellectual framework of Roe "appears
rather rigid and impoverished when viewed from a comparative
perspective." 46 While Glendon's analysis rests on comparative
42. Id. at 40. Unreasonable compromises, however, have been struck
down. Perhaps the best known opinion is that of the constitutional court of the
Federal Democratic Republic of West Germany. The West German Court inval-
idated a permissive abortion control law finding that a pregnant woman's free-
dom of choice was inappropriately broad. Id. at 26 (citing language of the
Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany). The decision was
followed by a retaliatory bombing of the court's building. See Olsen, Comment:
Unravelling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105, 105 n.3 (1989); West German Abor-
tion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MARSHALL J. oF PRAC. & PROC. 605
(R. Jonas &J. Gorby trans. 1976) (reprint of complete opinion).
The contrasting approaches of the American and West German courts are
noteworthy. The American High Court privileges individualistic values (privacy,
autonomy, and preferred life styles). The West German Court considered sev-
eral communitarian values that influence the formation of beliefs. See Kommers,
Liberty and Community in Constitutional Law: The Abortion Cases in Comparative Perspec-
tive, B.Y.U. L. REV. 371 (1985). The West German court recognized that devel-
oping human life in the womb was a societal interest deserving protection not
only for the sake of the fetus, but for the sake of the common weal. M. GLEN-
DON, supra note 37, at 38.
Similarly, the highest constitutional court in Spain concluded that "unborn
life is a public good protected by [Spain's] Constitution." Id. In France, abor-
tion laws are drafted in a way to "make sure everyone knows that abortion is
considered to be a serious matter." Id. at 17. In contrast, Canada's Supreme
Court invoked Roe to strike down a 1969 abortion statute which required ap-
proval of abortions by a hospital committee. See Morgentaler v. Regina, 1 S.C.R.
30 (Can. 1988). The court was deferential to the Canadian Parliament, however,
and recent legislative proposals for restricting abortion have received approval.
See L. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 70 (1990).
43. M. GLENDON, supra note 37, at 40.
44. Id. at 62. After studying relevant data including public opinion polls
taken over a lengthy period of time, Glendon wrote:
There is no evidence at all that 'conventional moral culture' validates
the fundamental and radical message . . . that no state regulation of
abortion in the interest of preserving unborn life is permissible in ap-
proximately the first six months of pregnancy, and that such regulation
in the last trimester is permissible only if it does not interfere with the
woman's physical and mental well-being.
Id. at 45.
45. Id. at 62.
46. Id. at 39. Article Four of the American Convention of Human Rights
582 [Vol. 35: p. 571
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law, I provide another comparative perspective: an historical nar-
rative tracing and defining the evolution of republicanism and
liberalism.
III. FROM THE ENLIGHTENMENT TO POST-MODERN HEDONISM
America's founders possessed a spirit of Lockean liberalism
that was tempered by their reading of medieval and ancient texts
describing republican federations and confederacies.47 Early
American political discourse was a mixture of republican civic vir-
tue, Protestant ethics, Deism, English empiricism, and Enlighten-
ment rationalism. The founders were liberal in some respects
and republican 48 in others. It was difficult to distinguish the aver-
age liberal from the middle-of-the-road republican. 49 There are
still many liberals whose views are compatible with many contem-
porary communitarian and republican precepts. Therefore, I use
the overlapping concepts of liberalism and republicanism very
loosely as ideal types.50
protects every person's life from the "moment of conception" and prohibits
most abortions since "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." Under
the United States Constitution, however, as currently interpreted, this provision
is not legally applicable.
47. See, e.g., L. STRAUSS, LIBERALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN 10, 28 (1968);
THE FEDERALIST No. 18 (A. Hamilton &J. Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 19 (A.
Hamilton &J. Madison); THE FEDERALIST No. 20 (A. Hamilton &J. Madison).
A primitive antecedent of liberalism was originally elaborated by Socrates
and Aristotle. In Socrates' time, "a liberal was a man who behaved in a manner
becoming a free man as distinguished from a slave." L. STRAUSS, supra at 28.
Originally, being a liberal meant not being subject to a tyrant. When the ancient
Greeks talked about liberty, however, they had in mind the liberty of the whole
people, the community-state (polis). Liberty to them was provided by a com-
monwealth of people sharing the same values. D. SPITZ, THE REAL WORLD OF
LIBERALISM 71-72 (1982).
48. See L. MACFARLANE, POLITICAL THEORY 235 n.l (1973). A republic, as I
use the term, is an elected, non-monarchial form of government. This conforms
to conventional usage. The republican tradition has roots in the cities of classi-
cal Greece and Rome. It was later expressed as civic humanism in late medieval
and modern Europe and in seventeenth century England before it was incorpo-
rated into the American republic tradition.
49. See L. STRAUSS, supra note 47, at 26-64. The notions of republicanism
and liberalism in classical antiquity were not easily severable.
50. Ideal types, which focus on a cluster of salient characteristics, are heu-
ristic devices that ignore nuances. In real life, American liberalism and republi-
canism are not radically different patterns of thought. Indeed, American
political thought is an amalgam of liberal and republican principles that, over
time, have been modified in content and emphasis. There are, however, some
obviously noteworthy differences although these differences cannot be incorpo-
rated into an analytically neat ordering. Ideal types serve as shorthand refer-
ences in lieu of a more discriminating approach sensitive to nuance. See
Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 57, 64 (1987).
1990] 583
13
Leedes: Liberalism, Republicanism and the Abortion Controversy
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Liberals traditionally focus upon what is permissible for per-
sons rather than upon what is good for the people. Many con-
temporary liberals still prefer a morally neutral, minimalist
state-a stripped down government with few powers. Others wel-
come more extensive economic regulation and central planning.
Even when liberals support governmental efforts to redress eco-
nomic inequality, their conception of the government's instru-
mental role is grounded in the human capacity for self-
determined autonomy.
Contemporary liberals emphasize the desirability of a value-
free pluralism and generally hold the view that what is morally
right should not usually be dictated by the criminal law. Republi-
canism, in contrast, envisions a unified community that is more
socially cohesive than a collection of asocial individuals who coin-
cidentally live in the same locality. The republican common-
wealth is held together by its members' shared creed and world
view. 5 1 Their framework of beliefs and values enables them to
evaluate their lives, and they are willing to impose their judg-
ments on others.
Unlike individualistic liberalism, which tolerates "law as a
necessary evil," 52 republicanism values law as a constitutive and
edifying element of civilization. 53 The republican criterion for a
just community is, in part, one which derives rights and duties
from the roots of a particular community's traditions. Republican
communalists believe that society shapes us more than we shape
society. Cultural conservatives who support republicanism's em-
phasis on civic virtue blame permissive liberalism for the spread
of decadence and the breakdown of law and order in our nation.
In the United States, republicanism and communitarianism
have become interwoven doctrines. Republicans emphasize civic
virtue as a norm that protects us against the excesses of democ-
racy. Communitarians believe that civic virtue gathers its sub-
51. See E. FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 87 (1976). In
some communitarian versions of republicanism, there is a heavy emphasis on
solidarity; therefore, communal morality is an important republican value. In
some versions of republicanism, the community is more important than the indi-
vidual's pursuit of property. For example, agrarian republicanism in late 18th
century America stressed equal property rights whereas urban republicanism
stressed economic growth. Id. at 100-05.
52. Horwitz, supra note 50, at 73. Horwitz traces the neutral-state ideal
from "early American political and constitutional thought to its application in
the current debate over characterizing American constitutional thought as re-
publican or liberal." Id.
53. Id. ("Under the republican view, law could create structures that ena-
bled individuals and communities to fulfill their deepest aspirations.").
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stantive meaning from enduring social norms. Needless to say,
many communitarians prefer the widest reasonable scope for an
individual's freedom of choice. Before elaborating further upon
the intertwined doctrines of republicanism and communitarian-
ism, I shall examine liberalism's underlying assumptions.
A. Liberalism's Original Assumptions
Many liberal assumptions became widely accepted as "self-
evident truths" during the Enlightenment, 54 a time of upheaval
when reason was praised in contrast with superstition, fanaticism,
traditional authority, and religious faith. With the Enlighten-
ment, a "new kind of moral, political, and epistemological justifi-
cation [for humanism] came into being, one that derived from the
natural, free, rational and morally autonomous individual."-55
A new model for scientific inquiry replaced the pre-Enlight-
enment outlook on the nature of the world. According to
Newtonian physics, the basic goal and presupposition of research
is universal order and law in the material world. The laws of the
physical universe constituted the preconceptual framework for
knowledge about reality.5 6 Accordingly, many eighteenth century
political theories describing a well-ordered legal system postu-
lated a permanent framework of reference that was "prior [or
preconceptual] to the very theories they frame." 57 Nature's laws
preceded the formation of the political state.
All parts of the political system were supposed to be gov-
erned by the same natural laws governing the cosmos. It follows
that human beings could be viewed as separate particles often col-
liding with each other.58 As a consequence, a system of govern-
54. See generally, S. STROMHOLM, A SHORT HISTORY OF LEGAL THINKING IN
THE WEST 180-211 (1985). I will not deal with the contrast between Enlighten-
ment writers described as rationalistic and those writers who were empiricists
relying on experience rather than innate principles, except to notice their com-
mon quest for premises (foundations supportive of systems of thought) that
were either self-evident to the human mind or verifiable scientifically.
55. E. WOLGAST, THE GRAMMAR OF JUSTICE 2 (1987).
56. B. BARBER, supra note 13, at 27.
57. Id. Descartes wrote, "What little knowledge of physics I have tried to
acquire.., has been a great help to me in establishing sure foundations in moral
philosophy." C. TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 148 (1989) (citing DESCARTES:
PHILOSOPHICAL LETrERS 196 (A. Kenny trans. 1970)). The source of morality,
according to liberal corollaries following from Cartesian axioms, is situated
within individuals who view themselves as if they were detached observers of
their minds, disengaged from others, and not obligated by their traditions.
58. See Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers Can Learn
from Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1989). Professor Tribe describes
Newton's model of "neutral, undifferentiated space" as one in which "objects
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ance that maintained a stable equilibrium was desirable.
Eventually, this world view was a foundation for natural law theo-
ries identifying natural rights.
Liberal philosophers during the Enlightenment "understood
freedom and power as antonyms, each defined (analytically) by
the absence of the other." 59 Any state which claimed to have an
exclusive monopoly on legitimate coercive power was viewed as a
threat to the individual seeking more freedom for rational action.
Enlightenment liberals wanted a system of separated powers
which would enable human beings to maximize their freedom to
satisfy their desires and needs.60
Liberalism has been modified to accommodate nineteenth
century Romanticism, twentieth century Freudian insights, and
post-modernism. 6' Theories of natural rights have fallen into dis-
favor. For example, liberalism has been adjusted to reflect eco-
nomic realities. Some liberals now admit the need for a certain
degree of government control over the economy in order to miti-
gate the inhumanity of unbridled private enterprise. 62 Liber-
alism, however, is still an anti-totalitarian ethos.
Except for economic justice issues, liberals continue to em-
phasize the importance of individual rights,63 the pursuit of pri-
vate goals, 64 instrumental rationalism, 65 tolerance, and a
might collide with one another, but.., could not alter the field of play." Id. at 4.
Newton was unaware of a modern philosophy of science holding that a scientist's
theory influences his observations, and that "the support provided a theory by
observation is specious." M. MARTIN, CONCEPTS OF SCIENCE EDUCATION 116
(1985).
59. B. BARBER, supra note 13, at 35.
60. Id. at 72-73 ("Power is no more than the 'present means to some future
good' (Hobbes), the 'primary social goods' by which the human animal secures
the interests arising out of his defining neediness (Rawls).").
61. I elaborate on post-modernism in two review essays: Leedes, Cross-Ex-
amining the Narrative of Law and Literature, 40J. OF LEGAL EDUC. -(1990), Leedes,
The Latest and Best Word on Legal Hermeneutics (Book Review), 65 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 375 (1990).
62. See I. BERLIN, supra note 23, at 11-12.
63. Several intertwined strands of liberal thought are relevant when politics
is discussed, such as libertarian, anarchist, egalitarian, contractarian, or utilita-
rian. Similarly, republican discourse can be conservative (classical republican or
contemporary communitarian), moderate, or pragmatic. See Michelman, Law's
Republic, 97 YALE L. J. 1493 (1988). See generally Symposium: The Republican Civil
Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1493-1723 (1988).
64. Kantian liberals might take exception to this statement because "Kant's
conception of will (Wille) is that of a desire that has submitted completely to the
formal prescriptions of universal reason." R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS
51 (1975).
65. See W. SULLIVAN, RECONSTRUCTING PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 26 (1982).
"[T]he moral and political outlook of liberalism is instrumental in its view of
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minimalist government. 66 Because of differences of opinion
about the ethics of abortion, they contend that the abortion issue
cries out for tolerance. Liberals respect the capacity of persons to
act as independent agents free to "choose their conceptions [of
the good life] for themselves." 67 They insist that the burden of
proof is always on those who propose governmental interference
with liberty.68
Many ideologues confuse liberal tolerance with nihilism, but
liberals are not nihilists. Indeed, liberals often fight unflinchingly
for their beliefs and for the rights of others to follow the dictates
of conscience. Generally, most liberals share the understanding
that an individual has a strong stake in securing justice not only
for himself but for everyone else as well. 69 Moderate liberals,
therefore, will accept compromises that are preferable to violent
resolutions of conflict. Compromises are, needless to say, usually
imperfect from a partisan point of view. They require the parties
negotiating an agreement to make concessions. Hedonists do not
easily make these concessions.
A liberal need not be purely hedonistic, as the example of
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) makes clear. Kant insisted upon
"notions of duty, morality, or moral obligation [which] must be
understood as rigorously distinct from notions of utility, pleasure,
and happiness." 70 According to Kant, the individual's uncritical
surrender to his random inclinations is akin to bondage, not free-
dom.7' Moreover, individuals lack moral autonomy, according to
Kant, if they are either enslaved by compulsive desires or if they
surrender to unworthy addictive appetites. Kant searched for
rules that the individual could set up for himself, and Kantian
political and social life. It identifies value with what is useful to the individual."
Id.
66. J. PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 241-43 (1979). Liberalism
in its classic political sense refers to a regime in which the government does not
impose a particular substantive conception of morality upon the governed.
Some so-called welfare liberals, however, support governmental intervention in
the economy. Welfare liberals stress conceptions of equality more so than eco-
nomic liberties and property rights.
67. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality,
77 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 522 (1989).
68. A. LEVINE, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: A CRITIQUE OF ITS THEORY 22-23
(1981). Levine believes that the individual should be left free from coercive con-
trol. He calls this idea "formal liberalism"-"marking off an area of non-inter-
ference." Id.
69. R. DWORKIN, supra note 20 at 492-94.
70. T. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM 18 (1988).
71. See I. KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 114 (H. Paton
trans. 1964).
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principles of morality are designed to lead enlightened individu-
als to freedom72 and emancipate them from oppressive traditions.
In short, Kantian theory imposes obligations that can be equated
with commands.
Kant's rules of moral autonomy are subsumed by the objec-
tive principle known as the categorical imperative: "Act in such a
way that the maxims of your actions can serve at the same time as
universal laws, that is, as maxims on which all other autonomous
agents may also act." s73 In popular discourse, this universal com-
mand has been compared to the golden rule of treating others as
you would have them treat you. 7 4 Individuals who accept the cat-
egorical imperative as a norm restricting desires disagree about
what it requires in specific cases. Therefore, concrete rules of law
become necessary. These rules, however, cannot objectively end
disagreements. For example, Kant is silent on whether a fetus is a
person who is owed duties by individuals and by the moral
community.
According to Kant, the existence of a just political state is
crucial because duly enacted laws are necessary to protect morally
autonomous persons. In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant works out
the duties ofjustice and duties of virtue. 75 Kant presents law as a
self-contained, formal system 76 that specifies the juridical rela-
tionships governing persons subject to a legal system's com-
mands. 77 The laws of the political state do not require the actual
72. R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 161, 192-93 (1989).
73. See R. SULLIVAN, IMMANUEL KANT's MORAL THEORY 49 (1989) (quoting I.
KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (H. Paton trans. 1964)).
74. "Kant himself explicitly argues against interpreting the Categorical Im-
perative in this way." Id. at 204. Kant stresses "the goal-setting nature of rea-
soning," a virtue not implicit in the golden rule. Id. A "key precondition for an
individual to perform [in accordance with Kant's three formulations of the cate-
gorical imperative] was the condition of autonomy, the full assumption of re-
sponsibility for one's own moral life." J. DUNN, WESTERN POLITICAL THEORY IN
THE FACE OF THE FUTURE 45 (1979). What enables the individual to be autono-
mous "is his capacity to reason, an ability to grasp formal relations." Id. at 44.
75. See I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE: PART I OF THE
"METAPHYSICS OF MORALS" (J. Ladd trans. 1955). Kant's discussion of judicial
duties occurs in part one of the Metaphysics of Morals published in 1797. See B.
AUNE, KANT'S THEORY OF MORALS 131 (1979) (discussing Kant's basic principles
of justice).
76. Kant's theory of law is an ideal that does not refer to the laws in force in
any particular jurisdiction and, therefore, he leaves unspecified the content of
the law's rules. Fletcher, Law and Morality. A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 533, 533-34 (1987).
77. According to Kant, judges may not use the opportunity presented by a
lawsuit to promote their preferred conception of the common good. The judge
must not confuse the welfare of the state with the welfare or happiness of the
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consent of every person. For Kant, a public law is illegitimate
only when "all the people could not possibly give it their con-
sent."78 In the absence of this unanimity, practical individuals us-
ing their common sense are expected to obey duly enacted laws,
however distasteful.79 Therefore, Kant does not limit the power
of the political state and, despite his hope for law-abiding moral
progress, his references to governmental power suggest that the
autonomous moral actor is not entitled to all of the rights needed
for acting in accord with the moral law.
Law and morality, in effect, become two distinct and
nonintersecting normative realms80 in Kant's politically conserva-
tive thought. 8' Kant did not banish ethics from his jurisprudence,
but his concept of public law obligated morally autonomous indi-
viduals to obey the enlightened state. Civil laws lay down what is
allowed and what is forbidden to the community. There is simply
no other alternative to combat egoism and the injustices it can
cause. The justification for the state rests on the liberal ground
that each person is obligated to recognize the freedom of every-
one else.82 Once again, however, Kant does not tell us how the
legislature is to decide the dubious case of whether a fetus should
be regarded as a human being entitled to the law's protection.
Kant's liberal theory, despite its contradictions, is preferable
to Thomas Hobbes's (1588-1669) discredited political science.
Hobbes believed that the state should be headed by a monarch
who dictated legal limits curtailing the individual's pursuit of hap-
piness. 83 Hobbes did not believe that a person had the capacity
to control his aggressiveness toward others by an exercise of ra-
tional "will." Hobbes, who loathed the concept of democracy, in-
citizens engaged in litigation. Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 472, 496-97 (1987).
78. B. AUNE, supra note 75, at 158.
79. Id.; see also Makkreel, Kant and the Interpretation of Nature and History, 21
PHIL. F. 169 (1989-90).
80. Kant wrote, "the problem of establishing the state . . . is soluble even
for a nation of devils provided they have sense,' " which, according to Strauss,
connotes "enlightened selfishness." See L. STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHT AND His-
TORY 193 (1953).
81. See Fletcher, supra note 76, at 534 (arguing that Kant's moral theory is
communitarian and his legal theory is individualistic or liberal). But see Benson,
External Freedom According to Kant, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (1987) (disputing inter-
pretation that Kant viewed law and morality as two discrete normative realms).
82. See R. SULLIVAN, supra note 73, at 256.
83. See S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION 268 (1960). Professor Wolin as-
tutely observes that "the laws and agreements of Hobbesian society were meant
to cover only a certain selected range of activity and to leave substantial areas
open to individual discretion." Id.
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sisted that rational individuals should invest a sovereign with
authority in order to maintain peace and security. The sovereign
must arbitrarily function as an "artificial substitute" for the peo-
ples' agreement about their legal obligations. 84 In short, Hobbes
believed it was instrumentally rational for all individuals to sub-
ject themselves to an authoritarian ruler.85
In some respects, John Locke (1632-1704) accepted Hobbes-
ian psychology. Unlike Hobbes, who supported a command the-
ory of law, Locke envisioned a more voluntarist legal system. In
The Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke wrote that reason
helps persons reach goals, but it cannot set the goals. 86 In
Locke's view, individuals use reason instrumentally as they satisfy
their basic needs.87 A theory of personal freedom that is the
foundation of the good community inevitably gives lexical norma-
tive priority to rights whether or not they advance transient con-
ceptions of the common good. Locke believed that an individual
could disengage himself from irrational community customs and
remake himself according to what will bring him the most happi-
ness. Relying in part upon empirical data, Christian ethics, and
natural law, Locke was convinced that mutual trust provides the
basis for a social contract. 88 From this social contract, which has
the tacit consent of everyone in civil society, civic obligations are
created and guaranteed. 89
Another basis for mutual trust during the Enlightenment was
proposed by Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) who believed that
most people are endowed with a moral sense which motivates in-
dividuals to act virtuously.90 The moral sense is not just another
84. See L. STRAUSS, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES 159 (1952).
85. L. STRAUSS, supra note 47, at 220. The Hobbesian social contract is an
undertaking in which people totally alienate their power to a sovereign. This is
an instrumental trade off to reduce violence. SeeJ. HAMPTON, HOBBES AND THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT TRADITION 3-4, 256-79 (1986).
86. See T. PANGLE, supra note 70, at 179-80 (citing J. LOCKE, THE ESSAY
CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, book II, ch. xxxiii, sec. 4 (P.H. Nidditch
ed. 1979)). Locke maintained that morality is capable of demonstration, but his
demonstration was based on so-called self-evident propositions such as the indi-
vidual's need for self-preservation. Id. at 182.
87. See id. at 187-89.
88. Id. at 145-66, 189-211; see also A. RAPACZYNSKI, NATURE AND POLITICS:
LIBERALISM IN THE PHILOSOPHIES OF HOBBES, LOCKE, AND ROUSSEAU 120 (1987).
"The social contract establishes the state including its legislative authority, for
the purpose of executing the laws of nature." T. PANGLE, supra note 70, at 202
n.68.
89. L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 81 (1987).
90. G. LEEDES, THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 39-41 (1986); C. TAY-
LOR, supra note 57, at 259-65; see also M. WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERI-
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primitive desire, but a much higher inclination. The moral sense
is not an "innate idea" in Descartes's sense nor a concept derived
from experience in a purely empirical sense.9 1 The world is
designed, in Hutcheson's view, so that each individual seeking his
or her notion of the good life will also be good. Hutcheson's
providential conception of the benevolent moral sense obviously
presents interpretive difficulties.9 2
The moral sense might produce socially beneficial agree-
ments.93 David Hume (1711-1776) insisted, however, that the
moral sense is shaped in part by "a consensus of sentiment and
passion ... established historically over time." 94 Hume rejected
the providential view of morality that was described by Locke and
Hutcheson and substituted a conventional view. For Hume, jus-
tice consisted of the rules that most people find useful. 95
Although Hume's conventional view of justice is consistent with
communitarian theory, his historicism sowed the seeds of con-
temporary liberalism. After Hume's skepticism was appropriated
by liberal thought, the notion of the public good and justice were
rendered infinitely malleable, if not normatively impoverished. 96
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), unlike Hume, looked for a
formula for recognizing substantive rules that maximize the
greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. 97 Using
Bentham's methodology, legislators add up each person's self-as-
sessment of utility and enact laws that reflect the sum of satisfi-
able desires which exceed avoidable pain and suffering.
CAN REVOLUTION 101-04 (1978); A. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH
RATIONALITY? 270-75, 278-79 (1988).
91. For a discussion of Descartes' views on the origin of ideas, see B. WIL-
LIAMS, DESCARTES: THE PROJECT OF PURE ENQUIRY 132 (1978).
92. For example, Hutcheson rejects the idea that there are objective moral
norms that are discoverable by reason. See G. LEEDES, supra note 90, at 41; A.
MCINTYRE, supra note 90, at 272-73.
93. Adam Smith wrote that "[b]y pursuing his own interests [the individual]
frequently promotes that of society more effectually than when he really intends
to promote it." A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (1976).
94. See A. MCINTYRE, supra note 90, at 319.
95. See id at 320. "What makes the utterance of judgments about virtue
and vice effective is that they express not merely one's own individual responses
but the responses shared and reciprocated by the same vast majority. Id.
96. See id. at 337-38. For a less critical view, see HISTORY OF POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 556 (L. Strauss &J. Cropsey eds. 1987).
97. The utilitarianism of Bentham "recognized only one good: pleasure."
C. TAYLOR, supra note 57, at 332. Bentham's calculus has been called a paradigm
for "reductive mechanical liberalism." J. DUNN, supra note 74, at 41. On the
plus side, Bentham bequeathed to liberalism and the Enlightenment the "moral
imperative to reduce suffering." C. TAYLOR, supra, at 394.
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Everyone's desires are taken into account, even those of undis-
ciplined sensualists who do not care about the community. Ac-
cording to Bentham, the community is "a fictitious body"
composed of its members. 98 Other writers disagree with Ben-
tham and believe that a community has value apart from its mem-
bers' interests.99 A moral theory like Bentham's utilitarianism, so
focused upon legislative actions that increase happiness for the
greatest number of people, "may well, given different social cir-
cumstances, lead to anti-liberal conclusions."' 100 A few in power
might decide that they know best what makes the masses happy.
Recently, liberals have disowned Bentham because of features of
his utilitarianism that curtail freedom.' 0'
In contrast, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) is famous for his
spirited defense of liberties that "contribute to self-realiza-
tion."10 2 Mill proposed a principle which, simply put, prevents
society from invading a protected zone of privacy if an individ-
ual's behavior is not likely to harm others. Mill believed that gov-
ernments should devote themselves to "optimizing the balance
between leaving peoples' private lives alone and preventing suf-
fering."' 1 3 Although it is a never-ending creative task to strike
the balance at the optimum point, Mill's mature writings on rep-
resentative government recognize the value of decentralization of
authority. 0 4 He did not consistently deny society's right to inter-
fere with an individual's conduct for the sake of its own preserva-
tion. Mill, the quintessential liberal, wrote, "[M]isplaced notions
of liberty prevent moral obligations . . . from being recognized,
and legal obligations from being imposed, where there are the
strongest grounds [for laws] .. ."105 Mill's concept of represen-
98. J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEG-
ISLATION 12 (1970) (emphasis in original).
99. For an elaboration on this republican conception of community, see in-
fra notes 120-163 and accompanying text.
100. J. RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 267 (1986). Therefore, many lib-
erals reject utilitarianism in favor of a rights-based liberalism that invokes the
"Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means; they may not
be sacrificed or used for the achieving of [the government's] ends without their
consent." R. NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 31 (1974).
101. R. FLATHAM, supra note 3, at 111.
102. Id.
103. R. RORTY, supra note 72, at 63. "Mill suffered deeply in his own life
from the conflict between the demands of the most austere disengaged reason
and the need for a richer sense of [life's] meaning, which he ultimately found
through the Romantic poets." C. TAYLOR, supra note 57, at 458.
104. D. THOMPSON, JOHN STUART MILL AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
131 (1976).
105. M. GLENDON, supra note 37, at 122 (quoting J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in
592 [Vol. 35: p. 571
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tative government, in practice, requires compromises among peo-
ple with differences of opinion. Indeed, the United States
Constitution, admired by many Millians, is the product of a com-
promise that resolved a political crisis.
B. Contemporary Liberalism and the Abortion Controversy
John Stuart Mill, a feminist, is often regarded as a patron
saint of liberalism. His opposition to paternalism and legal mor-
alism is consistent with the Supreme Court's protection of rights
of "privacy." Pro-choice abortion groups cite Mill's work, On Lib-
erty, claiming that "the [g]overnment should not interfere in so
personal a decision [as abortion]."' 1 6 Pro-life groups rely on an
arguably more inclusive conception of social justice which counts
the fetus as a member of the community who is subject to harm.
They fear what Mill feared: that a purely instrumental view of
rationality empties life of meaning and thereby ultimately threat-
ens the institutions of self-government. 10 7 The chasm between
pro-life and pro-choice groups was bridgeable before Roe when
both sides were free to negotiate and compromise. But even after
Webster, when seemingly irreconcilable differences are debated in
vehement political discourse, practical compromises can and
must be found on "the rough contours of a way of life."' 08
Liberals, who refuse to compromise the principles of Roe, fre-
quently claim that cultural conservatives attach too much weight
to society's common good. Liberalism as a political doctrine,
however, fails to provide cogent answers to several difficult ques-
tions about society's common good. For example, should the
self-governing people in a liberal state be satisfied with having
provided the conditions for the pursuit of happiness, or should
they be more specific about what constitutes happiness, the good
UTILITARIANISM, LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 219-20 (1951)).
Thus, there is merit to Justice O'Connor's approach, which asks whether the
woman's choices are unduly burdened. It is an approach that suggests the desira-
bility of a case by case ad hoc balancing. For a discussion of Justice O'Connor's
approach, see infra notes 171-78 and accompanying text.
106. Berke, The Abortion-Rights Movement Has Its Day, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15,
1989, § 4 (The Week in Review), at 1, col. 5; see also Dworkin, The Future of Abor-
tion, supra note 20, at 47, 51; Dworkin, The Great Abortion Case, 36 N.Y. REV.
BooKs, June 29, 1989, at 49-50.
107. See C. TAYLOR, supra note 57, at 500.
108. Walzer, A Critique of Philosophical Conversation, 21 PHIL. F. 191 (1989-
90); see also I. BERLIN, supra note 23, at 166 (necessary to strike a compromise
between irreconcilable attitudes).
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life, and the common good? 10 9 Critics of contemporary liber-
alism argue that liberalism is an incomplete theory of politics be-
cause it tells government what it ought not do, and yet fails to
guide us normatively because its vision of the good is in the eye of
each beholder.
Critics of liberalism recite a list of its antinomies and contra-
dictions. For example, liberals praise educational pursuits, and
yet liberalism is often anti-intellectual. Liberals respect the dig-
nity of each individual even as they show their distrust of individ-
uals in positions of power. In liberal thought, there is an
admiration for both materialism and idealism, as well as a "fluctu-
ation between higher law constitutional theories and more posi-
tivistic, utilitarian views.""l 0 Some conventional legal scholars
recite the adage that "liberalism displays an unresolved tension
between its conceptions of liberty and equality" when dealing
with "connections between constitutional issues of political
equality and liberal theory.""' Liberals manifest simultaneous
respect for and suspicion of all religions. Liberals endorse toler-
ance, but are increasingly intolerant when insensitive persons use
racial and ethnic slurs and sexist stereotypes that stigmatize mem-
bers of traditionally victimized groups. Liberals insist upon pop-
ular sovereignty, usually in the form of a representative
democracy, but they fear the power of political majorities even as
they support and participate in their favorite political action
groups.
It is further alleged that liberalism fails to aid the develop-
ment of cohesive communities. Its heavy emphasis on each indi-
vidual's desires disables people from evaluating which desires are
politically worth satisfying and which desires are pernicious. In
its libertarian version, liberalism fails to adequately protect the
environment, future generations, and the impoverished under-
class.'12 Feminists criticize "the abstract equality of liberalism
[which] permits women little more than ... substantive inequal-
109. Liberalism cannot provide us with an intellectually satisfying concep-
tion of the common good. See W. SULLIVAN, supra note 65, at 13, 15.
110. R. SMITH, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 4 (1985).
Moreover, there is a divergence between the "strand of liberal thinking that em-
phasizes individual moral autonomy and . . .utilitarian strand." W. SULLIVAN,
supra note 65, at 18.
111. R. SMITH, supra note 110, at 8.
112. Mill himself excluded children, idiots, lunatics and colonized savages
from the category of persons entitled to liberties within the private realm. See
THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 956 (E. Burtt ed. 1939) (citing
J.S. Mill, On Liberty).
[Vol. 35: p. 571594
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss3/2
THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY
ity." 1 13 Even critics who regard liberalism as superior to other
political theories point out its theoretical vulnerability. In short, a
liberal theory of justice lacks guiding principles because it does
not indicate what is substantively valuable nor which community
conceptions of the good life should be affirmatively privileged.
On the other hand, liberalism is responsible for many ad-
vances in the nations that accept it as a dominant ideology: its
victories include the emancipation of some traditionally op-
pressed minorities and a greater degree of tolerance for noncon-
formists. Liberalism has been responsible for a widespread
appreciation of the dignity of the individual. Each person is con-
sidered, regardless of his or her non-conforming behavior, wor-
thy of equal respect. On a more materialistic level, liberalism
facilitates scientific breakthroughs and solutions to technical
problems. It also has produced a perennially increasing gross na-
tional product, investment opportunities, economic incentives,
and the satisfaction of consumer demands. Since the New Deal,
liberals have become the primary advocates of the economic
needs of the impoverished.' 14 Liberalism's cultural permissive-
ness, however, has caused a conservative backlash that gained
strength during the Reagan era and resulted in the appointment
of several justices who are cultural conservatives.
Daniel Bell, a cultural conservative,i 15 describes what he con-
siders to be the perversion of political liberalism. He condemns
the 1960s counter-culture, which made an imaginative admixture
of art and life a model for the good life. Bell contends that what
made liberalism possible during its finest moments were certain
norms of self-control. But the recently expanded ultra-liberal
conception of freedom does not refer to sacred enclaves of liberty
so much as it proclaims that there is "nothing sacred."i 16 "One
113. C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 16 (1987); see also FEMI-
NISM/POSTMODERNISM (L. Nicholson ed. 1990).
114. Among the important issues in the abortion debate, not pursued in
this article, is the question of economic justice. Arguably, laws restricting abor-
tion discriminate against women who want economic opportunities routinely
open to men. A state's prohibition of abortion might not eliminate abortion as
an option for those who can afford to travel and pay for the surgical procedure
in jurisdictions where abortions are legal. A poor woman, however, does not
have that option. She may be forced to choose between a dangerous illegal
abortion and the economic hardships caused by the costs of supporting a child.
See C. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 184-94 (1989).
115. D. BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM Xi (2d ed.
1978) ("I am a socialist in economics, a liberal in politics, and a conservative in
culture.").
116. Id. at xxi.
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cost," Bell writes, "has been the... spread of an antinomian atti-
tude to moral norms and even to the idea of cultural judgment
itself.""t 7 Bell claims that the new emphasis on mere subjectiv-
ism, trendy life styles, and radical non-conformity, rather than
upon character and self discipline, "has trivialized the culture."" 18
He describes a culture that, during the 1970s, was in the process
of disintegration, but which is now groping for a sense of
limits. '19
The emerging socially conservative majority on the Supreme
Court shares Bell's concerns. Webster, for example, was a re-
sponse to the concern that some of Roe's principles, as applied,
have shredded America's moral fiber and that this deterioration
has trivialized the value of genetically human life. The Court is
now more inclined to view an abortion-control statute as a reflec-
tion of a genuine community understanding of how a particular
issue should be resolved. Now that Webster has given states more
leeway to regulate abortion, many energized pro-choice activists
are finding grass roots support for a reaffirmation of Roe's princi-
ples. I shall return to the abortion controversy after I discuss
communitarian conceptions of the common good which evolved
into American republicanism.
IV. COMMUNITARIAN CONCEPTIONS OF THE COMMON GOOD
A. From Ancient Greece: A Narrative
In contrast to individualistic liberalism, American Republi-
canism evolved from communitarian conceptions of the common
good. The dominant vision 20 of reality in a liberal society is the
isolated individual' 2' who has the cognitive capacity to enter into
117. Id. at xxii.
118. Id. at xxvii.
119. Id. at xxix. Bell argues that it is surprising that the nation is not only
tolerating the counter-culture but celebrating its mindlessness. Id.
120. "Visions," as Thomas Sowell uses the word, are pretheoretical, "what
we sense or feel before we have constructed any systematic reasoning that could
be called a theory . . . . A vision is our sense of how the world works." T.
SOWELL, A CONFLICT OF VISIONS 14 (1987).
121. Liberals deny "the centrality of relationships in constituting the self."
Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy, 1 YALEJ. L. & FEMINISM 7, 9 (1989). According
to many communitarians, however, there is no "pre-existing, unitary self in iso-
lation from relationships." Id. at 9 n.4. This was the only vision in Homer's
depiction of ancient Greece. "The self becomes what it is in heroic societies
only through its role; it is a social creation, not an individual one." A.
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 129 (1984).
[Vol. 35: p. 571
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an instrumentally rational social contract. 122 Critics123 of this vi-
sion assert that individuals should not be reduced by liberal writ-
ers to dehumanized abstractions separated from society and
concrete social norms. 124 These critics believe that interpersonal
relationships help individuals become better citizens as they abide
by and internalize a given code of ethics closely bound up with
their society. Communitarian thought holds that a person cannot
become a complete human being if he or she focuses all attention
on his or her wants and desires. Some communitarian scholars
suggest that liberalism has roots in the ancient idea of "the
human good" and that liberals should not ignore ways to connect
conceptions of their self-interest with the common good. 125
The communitarian ethos presupposes cooperative individu-
als who become integrated into a community 26 and who achieve
freedom by acting altruistically in concert with other socialized
persons. This political activity is called collective self-determina-
tion. Such individuals look to families, friendships, peer groups
and voluntary associations (communities within communities) for
confirmation of their identity and self respect. Within these com-
munities, participating individuals not only have a place, an
anchor, allegiances, and moral bearings, but they become more
caring human beings. When an individual engenders respect
from others by recognizing his or her obligations to them, life
gains its greatest meaning.
Contemporary communitarian discourse "has obvious con-
nections to the Aristotelian position that human nature is realized
122. Habermas, Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning "Stage 6",
21 PHIL. F. 32, 37-38 (1989-90). Arguably, a person's capacity to enter into a
social contract is comprehensible only with reference to shared social norms,
values, and concepts-standards that supply a context in which individuals inter-
act and relate to each other.
123. See, e.g., A. MACINTYRE, supra note 121; M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND
THE LIMITS OFJUSTICE (1982) (focusing on the liberal theory ofjustice); C. TAY-
LOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 3 (1985) ("[T]o be a full human
agent is to exist in a space defined by distinctions of worth ... incorporated into
[one's] self-understanding.").
124. Communitarians assert that individuals who have accepted the idea of
civic virtue as a limit on self interest do not claim a right to prevent the govern-
ment from achieving public happiness. The term public happiness "includes
everything from adequate public facilities to the trust and civic friendship that
makes public life something to be enjoyed rather than feared." R. BELLAH, supra
note 21, at 335.
125. See generally C. Taylor, Critical and Conventional Morality (1988) (un-
published manuscript). The notion that rights are ontological entities that exist
independently of the common good no longer goes unquestioned. See M.
PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS & LAw 60, 62 (1988).
126. See generally M. SANDEL, supra note 123.
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most fully within a community, by a citizen of the polis."127 The
communitarian defines a community by its constituent members'
vision of the good life, and each individual's vision is limited by
the community's menu of ideas. 128 In this sense, communities are
ontological entities that shape the individual's definition of him-
self. Communitarians invariably contend that what is good for
the community is also good for the individual. 129 Liberals have
difficulty with this premise. Each liberal has a different concep-
tion of the conditions necessary for human flourishing, and they
believe that the morality of a polis is often superficial and
oppressive. 13 0
If we refer to ancient history, we can reconstruct the origin' 3 '
of a communitarian ethos that preceded liberalism. In the society
chronicled by Homer, who lived before 700 B.C., morality and
social structure were one and the same.132 For the Homeric man,
127. L. WEINREB, supra note 89, at 251. "For Aristotle the polis is a com-
plete and self-sufficient community because it provides context and resources
completely adequate for the full and complete development of a man." J. FIN-
NIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 160 n.VI.6 (1980) (citing ARISTOTLE,
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS I, 6-7: 1097b7-17 and ARISTOTLE, POLITICS I, 1:
1252b29; III, 5: 1281al).
128. A singular perception of what the good life is may not be easily attain-
able for there are many different types of communitarians: conservative, social-
istic, and anarchistic. Selznick, The Idea of a Communitarian Morality, 75 CALIF. L.
REV. 445 (1987).
129. In some communitarian societies, individuals who do not conform to
the rules are punished or banished. "In [some] 'mass' societies, the healthy
communitarian need for common foundations and a certain minimal homogene-
ity quickly becomes an unhealthy quest for uniformity." B. BARBER, supra note
13, at 243. Unfortunately, there are "bogus" communitarians who appeal to
community as a means to "enslave humankind." Id. at 120. The human yearn-
ing for a sense of belonging cannot be ignored, however, by citing the worst
abuses of totalitarian societies.
A less frightening conception of communitarianism is the view that a com-
munity is simply a group of socially interdependent people who participate to-
gether in discussions and decision making, and who engage in certain shared
activities or practices that are not undertaken as a means to an end but are per-
ceived as ethically good in themselves. These shared activities are nurtured by
the community which itself is then, in turn, defined by its members' common
values. See R. BELLAH, supra note 21, at 335.
130. According to Montesquieu, when a genuine communitarian ethos is
lacking in society, "the public good is sacrificed to a thousand private views."
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 120 (1949) (T. Nugent trans. 1949).
131. "Stories of origin locate law, invest it with legitimacy, and so lend it
stability." Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Change, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2280
(1989).
132. Morality as something distinct from self-validating customs did not yet
exist. See A. MACINTYRE, supra note 121, at 123. In Homeric society, a person
did not step back and evaluate the social norms as an outside evaluator might.
Homer's heroes' perceptions and emotions are not integrated. Homer's Iliad
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there could be no evaluative moral standards external to those
embodied in the structure of his own community.133 The very
idea of a normative order was immanent in the "laws that were as
much moral as physical."' 3 4 This was a world of clearly defined
roles in which citizens had no need to debate with each other over
which principles to follow. The cosmic order never changed.
Two hundred years after Homer, Heraclitus explained that
the cosmos was not static, but constantly changing. If one per-
ceives the world as constantly changing, it is possible for moral
standards to change along with other parts of the cosmos. Moral
disagreement arises not only when one set of virtues is "counter-
posed to another [but] also because rival conceptions of one and
the same virtue coexist."' 3 5 What can be done? In circa 500 B.C.,
Heraclitus wrote in support of the aristocrats against the new rev-
olutionary forces that "[a] people ought to fight for the laws of
the city as if they were its walls."' 3 6 Plato (c. 429-347 B.C.), an
elitist, argued that authorities responsible for enforcing the law
need not defer to any community's consensus of opinion.
Aristotle (c. 384-322 B.C.) tried to solve the problems of the
changing world described by Heraclitus and others without
resorting to Plato's immutable and authoritative "Ideas" (eidos).
In contrast to Plato, who believed that nature is governed by gen-
eral laws imperfectly understood, Aristotle was convinced that na-
ture and our place within it can be reasoned out, discussed,
comprehended, and put to practical use. Aristotle wanted to
learn the ultimate purposes of human beings and to identify their
functions. Aristotle believed that the highest purpose of the most
virtuous human beings was cooperative participation in gov-
erning and being governed by a city state-a polis.
"Aristotle's ontology ... was teleological ... [but] [t]he pur-
posiveness that he had in mind was not outside our experi-
ence." 37 Aristotelian politics erwisions individuals in association
with others in the city state-a community of values. 38 The good
has no single word equivalent to what we call the mind, the soul, or a con-
science. See H. BLOOM, RUIN THE SACRED TRUTHS 29-31 (1989).
133. A. MACINTYRE, supra note 121, at 133.
134. L. WEINREB, supra note 89, at 19.
135. A. MACINTYRE, supra note 121, at 133.
136. K. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES 12-13 (1963).
Although best known for his theories about change, Heraclitus held "the com-
plementary belief in an inexorable law of destiny." Id. at 16.
137. L. WEINREB, supra note 89, at 32-33.
138. "The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical loca-
tion; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking
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political life depends on inculcated virtues that transform a selfish
child into an empathetic adult. In a healthy community, the good
man is identical to the good citizen.
In the polis, any individual who becomes unwisely preoccu-
pied with his or her particular interests or private goods is
deemed a source of corruption. An Aristotelian concept of vir-
tues distinguishes between what a particular pleasure-seeking in-
dividual "takes to be good for him and what is really good for him
as a man."' 3 9 From this ancient standpoint, "a modern liberal
political society can appear only as a collection of citizens from
nowhere who have banded together for their common protec-
tion." 140 The modern liberal believes that we can become virtu-
ous,14 ' but not by virtue of our political participation, as Aristotle
maintained. 142
According to communitarians, the modern liberal conception
of the self is too thinly constituted to be the most reliable source
of moral rules. Only a fully constituted person with character and
a history that attaches him to others "can make significant moral
decisions."143 The function of the community is to help individu-
als to shoulder their civic responsibilities. American liberals are
familiar enough with the communitarian ethos to engage in some
critical thinking about how modern liberalism might be modified
by the venerable notion of the common good. In fact, the foun-
ders tried to institutionalize the common good in our republican
form of government. 144 The most influential leaders during
America's transition from separate colonies to a unified republic
knew that its success depended on the mobilization of the intelli-
together," in a community of values that enables persons to distinguish them-
selves by living together and sharing words and deeds. H. ARENDT, THE HUMAN
CONDITION 197 (1958). For a helpful discussion of Aristotelian thought, see M.
GRAT, THE CLASSICAL GREEKS 250-62 (1989).
139. A. MACINTYRE, supra note 121, at 150 (emphasis added).
140. Id. at 156.
141. In the liberal tradition, even in its more benign forms such as minimal-
ism, "virtues remain largely instrumental; they are valued less in and for them-
selves than for the sake of the individualist ends they faithfully serve." B.
BARBER, supra note 13, at 17.
142. See id. at 8.
143. L. WEINREB, supra note 89, at 253.
144. According to J. Pocock, a republic exists "to realize for its citizens all
the values which men [and now women] are capable of realizing in this life." J.
POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 3 (1975). The republican tradition treats
a citizen's active participation in government as an educational enterprise that,
when habitually practiced by all citizens with political rights, facilitates the gov-
ernment's efforts for achieving common good. Id. at 56-59.
[Vol. 35: p. 571600
30
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 3 [1990], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss3/2
THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY
gence and civic virtue of all citizens and lawmakers. Our nation
has the same need today. The following section focuses on the
problem of designing a self-governing republic.
B. The Early American Republic
In 1775, "for [most] Americans, the idealistic goal of their
Revolution" was the common good. 145 Thomas Paine convinced
Americans that republics furthered "the good of the whole, in
contradistinction to the despotic form [of government], which
makes the good of ... one man, the only object of the govern-
ment."'146 Republican optimism and enthusiasm notwithstand-
ing, there were realists in 1775 who "perceived the inherent
conflict between individual liberty and traditional republican
theory."1 47
Post-revolution, the prevalence of "leveling" legislation
alarmed the class of persons with vested interests.' 48 There was
corruption in every state,1 49 causing Americans to have doubts
about the suitability of their society for republicanism. 50 Even
skeptics, however, still hoped that the inspiring republican ideal
could be an instrument for reform and moral regeneration.' 5'
By 1787, faith in republicanism waned and pessimism re-
placed the earlier optimism about human nature. 52 Madison
wrote that "[t]he latent causes of faction are ... sown in the na-
ture of man." 53 He reluctantly concluded that "local prejudices"
cannot be prevented by the individual's moral sense or sense of
civic virtue.' 54 In an effort to rally support for the new Constitu-
145. G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 53
(1969).
146. Id. at 55-56.
147. Id. at 64.
148. Almost immediately after the Revolutionary War began, the evidence
indicating the inability of Americans to govern themselves under republican
principles of civic virtue became alarming. By 1780, the American's inveterate
suspicion of the crown and its agents was transferred to the state legislatures, for
"people . . .were as capable of despotism as any prince; public liberty was no
guarantee after all of private liberty." Id. at 410.
149. There was evidence of sustained corruption by officials in office who
were not acting as trustworthy public servants because, lacking character and
civic virtue, they could not resist the temptations of power which facilitated their
greedy quest for luxury and wealth. Id. at 410, 416-18.
150. G. WOOD, supra note 145, at 94-97.
151. Id. at 113-14.
152. Id. at 424.
153. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 55 (J. Madison) (E. Earle ed. 1937).
154. G. WOOD, supra note 145, at 505 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 27 (.
Madison)).
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tion, Madison claimed he had found a "republican remedy for the
diseases" plaguing the American people.' 55 Although fostering
the common good was still their stated goal, the founders drafted
the new Constitution 56 to protect vested interests 57 because
they feared democratic "excesses against personal liberty and pri-
vate property."' 58 Madison hoped that a mixed republican and
liberal form of government with checks and balances would pre-
vent "factional interests from gaining a position of dominance in
government and the society."' 59
How can a constitution advance the common good when
neither the political majorities nor minorities can be trusted?' 60
The Framers' dilemma had to be resolved through trial and error
by a people with enough moral backbone to maintain civic virtue.
Unfortunately, civic virtue "seemed to be in danger of completely
disappearing as every man and every social group sought private
goods at the expense of harmony and other people's rights."' 16 1
Gordon Wood captured the essence of the realpolitik that was
triumphing during the ratification debates. He wrote:
No longer was man to be obsessed with the way he ought
to live; he was now to base his government on the way he
actually lived. In place of the high ideals of the ancients
that sought to compel man to transcend his lowly pas-
sions and interests, modern governments were now to
be founded on these very passions and interests. Mod-
ern man became obsessed with his particular private pur-
suits of happiness and his individual desires, which he
calls rights. Reason was dethroned, civic participation
was reduced to periodic voting, and the public good was
155. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 153, at 62.
156. G. WOOD, supra note 145, at 505; see also R. BELLAH, supra note 21, at
253 (citing excerpts from Madison's writings and The Federalist).
157. See Manley, Class and Pluralism in America: The Constitution Reconsidered, in
THE CASE AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION 106 (1987) (Framers' struggle with role of
class in Constitution led to decision to focus concern on property).
158. Id. at 114 (citing 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 517 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) (statement by Gouverneur Morris)).
159. N. ORNSTEIN & S. ELDER, INTERESTS GROUPS, LOBBYING AND POLI-
CYMAKING 9 (1978). Madison rejected the republican tradition of small-scale de-
mocracy in which an active citizenry personally participates in lawmaking. See
generally Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29
(1985).
160. R. BORK, supra note 29, at 139.
161. Banning, From Confederation to Constitution: The Revolutionay Context of
the Great Convention, in READINGS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 10
(1989).
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lost in the scramble for private interests. 62
Despite the opposition of many Anti-Federalists, 63 the Constitu-
tion was ratified.
The founding generation learned to live with the opposition
between the concept of economic man and homo socilologicus, the
politically mature person whose civic virtue and behavior con-
forms to community norms. Social tensions generated by this
ideological dichotomy were reduced and ameliorated by great
political compromises. In contrast, it is obvious that contempo-
rary liberals and republicans cannot communicate effectively or
negotiate compromise if they mindlessly believe their own polit-
ical action groups' paid television advertisements. What compro-
mise requires is a thoughtful exchange of ideas.
We need ideas that connect liberalism's intuitive preferences
for freedom of choice with equally powerful moral intuitions
about what is good for humanity. Compromises are more likely
in our profoundly changing global village if liberals face up to the
contingency of their own convictions and if republicans realize
that their ideas about the common good are largely products of
location, tradition, and chance.
V. PROSPECTS OF LEGISLATIVE COMPROMISES AFTER WEBSTER
Encouraged by Webster, groups favoring severe restrictions
on women seeking abortions and supporters of abortion on de-
mand might negotiate sensible compromises-a common occur-
rence in Western Europe. 164 Although "[t]here are no easy
recipes" for agreements in a pluralistic democracy, 65 it is possi-
ble to find a blend of ingredients that narrow differences among
162. Wood, The Fundamentalists and the Constitution, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb.
18, 1988, at 34.
163. H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 3 (1981). By and
large, "[tihe Anti-Federalists were committed to both union and the states; to
both the great American republic and the small, self-governing community; to
both commerce and civic virtue; to both private gain and public good." Id. at 6.
To reconcile these seemingly incompatible contradictions, they wanted a system
that would encourage voluntary obedience to laws, responsible office holders,
and a virtuous population. Id. at 16.
164. See M. GLENDON, supra note 37, app. at 145-50 (Appendix A: Coun-
tries Permitting Abortion for Cause).
165. Id. at 142. Philip Selznick wrote: "The... quest for a communitarian
morality must recognize the great contribution liberalism has made to our civili-
zation-in reinforcing values of political and economic liberty, democracy,
equality, the rule of law, respect for diversity, academic freedom, and perhaps
much else." Selznick, supra note 128, at 463.
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the groups participating in the abortion controversy.' 66
Several regulations aimed at abortion clinics might be accept-
able to the moderate elements of both the pro-choice and pro-life
communities. For example, regulations that ensure safe abor-
tions, if the restrictions are reasonable from a medical standpoint,
should not be objectionable to moderates in either camp. Femi-
nists might be persuaded to support laws regulating profit-seek-
ing abortionists if there is factual support for a legislative
judgment that women are being exploited by proprietors of abor-
tion clinics. Moderates oppose abortions in the third trimester
and the pro-choice community should concede that these abor-
tions are frequently difficult to justify. As part of a compromise
package, legislatures should consider providing more state aid in
the form of financial assistance, day care centers and maternity
leave from work for mothers unable to support or care for their
babies. A state's interest in encouraging parental involvement
may justify notification requirements for minors seeking abor-
tions. 167 Parental notification should not be required, however,
when a physician has reason to believe that the minor's family is
dysfunctional or if the parent to be notified is abusive, guilty of
incest, or is not likely to be helpful.' 68
A parental notification statute, if rational, protects the legiti-
mate interests of an unemancipated minor seeking a non-thera-
peutic abortion if she has a good reason not to notify her parents.
In such cases, the minor's physician should submit an affidavit to
a court; the minor should not have to appear herself unless the
government has substantial evidence indicating the affidavit is un-
true. Another alternative is an adult involvement law, which al-
lows a pregnant adolescent in her early teens to notify any family
166. See generally, M. GLENDON, supra note 37, at 142.
167. For examples of recent Supreme Court decisions addressing the con-
stitutionality of statutes requiring parental notification for minors seeking abor-
tions, see Hodgson v. Minnesota, 58 U.S.L.W. 4957 (U.S.June 25, 1990) (state's
strong interest in welfare of its citizens justifies reasonable legislation requiring
minor to obtain parental consent prior to terminating pregnancy); Ohio v. Ak-
ron Center for Reproductive Health, 58 U.S.L.W. 4979 (U.S. June 25, 1990)
(holding that Ohio statute requiring physician to give notice to parent of minor
child prior to performing abortion on minor does not impose unconstitutional
burden on minor).
168. Both the Minnesota and Ohio parental notification statutes provide a
mechanism for by-passing the parental notification requirement if, for example,
one of the minor's parents has engaged in a pattern of physical, sexual or emo-
tional abuse against her. See Hodgson, 58 U.S.L.W. at 4959; Ohio, 58 U.S.L.W. at
4981.
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member of her choice, or other designated adults such as judges,
clergy, impartial ethicists or reputable counselors.
The anti-totalitarian principle should be adopted by the
Supreme Court when it evaluates the validity of any legislative
compromise. The anti-totalitarian principle of liberalism protects
women from being reduced to mere instrumentalities of the state
regardless of their hopes, careers and plans. Applying this princi-
ple, the Court should invalidate legislation which sentences a wo-
man to prison when she seeks escape from a trauma-laden
pregnancy. Women must have access to adequate medical treat-
ment when they are suffering from the unbearable consequences
of a pregnancy. The Constitution, if interpreted under evolving
humane principles of liberalism and republicanism, does not give
any rights to a fetus whose birth will ruin a woman's life. The
anti-totalitarian principle, however, does not rule out reasonable
legislation prohibiting abortions when parents elect abortion be-
cause of the gender of a particular fetus. There are still other
restrictions that would not unduly burden the exercise of the
abortion privilege. For example, reasonable laws obligating phy-
sicians to provide a patient with information consistent with the
usual requirements for informed consent are rarely unjustifiable.
The anti-totalitarian approach enables courts to consider the
extent to which legislation regulating abortions interferes with a
woman's future prospects for parity as a citizen in a political com-
munity currently dominated by males.1 69 This approach permits
women to obtain abortions in situations where their future is seri-
ously endangered. 70 No constitutional principle, however, pre-
vents states from prohibiting abortions demanded solely for
169. Professor Tribe has written that mandatory childbearing is similar in
some respects to "involuntary servitude prohibited by the thirteenth amend-
ment to the Constitution." L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at 1353-54. In some cases,
abortion control laws subject women to a lengthy period of involuntary servi-
tude that limits her options in an intolerable manner. The anti-totalitarian prin-
ciple condemns involuntary servitudes but surely not every law which regulates
the conditions of legal abortions is similar to involuntary servitudes condemned
by the thirteenth amendment.
170. A recently proposed Canadian statute is consistent with the premises
of liberalism, democracy, the founding generation's conception of a social con-
tract, and the anti-totalitarian principle. The bill, if enacted, would prohibit
non-therapeutic abortions, but allows abortion if a physician believes that con-
tinued pregnancy will have an adverse effect on his or her patient's physical,
mental, or psychological health. See L. TRIBE, supra note 42, at 70. In such
cases, Republicans should realize that the impact of criminal sanctions on the
woman's life is a counter-productive and unwise way to integrate authentic per-
sons into a genuine community. See Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: To-
ward Love, Compassion and Wisdom, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1011, 1048 (1989).
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reasons of convenience. The constitutional law question,
stripped of politicized rhetoric, is whether the reasonable expec-
tations of a woman will be shattered by an unreasonable law. The
Court's role is to curtail the excesses of political majorities. The
Court exceeds its bounds, however, if it presumes that reasonable
compromises are facially unconstitutional.
The judiciary will be effective and helpful so long as it re-
mains trustworthy and politically neutral. Fidelity to process is
the hallmark of a trustworthy, non-partisan court. The Supreme
Court will lose credibility, however, if it upholds draconian,
mandatory and unrealistic childbearing laws. Normally, such laws
are the products of a malfunctioning political process that has
been manipulated by zealots who do not represent the moderate
majority. Such laws do not advance the common good of all
members of the political community. On the other hand, if wo-
men are not victimized by a return to the dark ages, the social
norms of communities should not be cavalierly disregarded.
The anti-totalitarian principle is implicit in Justice
O'Connor's approach. Her opinions may help the Court's
emerging majority formulate opinions that are consistent with its
perceived role as an impartial umpire. As a pivotal influence on
the Court, Justice O'Connor has demonstrated in a wide variety
of cases 71 that she is attuned to "the specific needs and interests
of the particular persons whose fates she decides."' 72
In abortion cases, Justice O'Connor inquires whether state
regulation unduly burdens a woman seeking an abortion. 173 Her
case by case approach does not predetermine the outcome of an
appeal. 174 She objects to a "per se rule under which any regulation
171. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). In Goldman, an Orthodox Jew serving in the Air Force sought to
wear a yarmulke in an indoor military environment despite an Air Force regula-
tion forbidding such conduct. The majority of the Court found that the first
amendment did not require the military to accommodate such a practice. Id. at
510. In her dissent, Justice O'Connor found that "the Government's policy of
uniformity must yield to the individual's assertion of the right of free exercise of
religion" under the circumstances. Id. at 532 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
172. Michelman, supra note 24, at 14.
173. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecol-
ogists, 476 U.S. 749 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (Pennsylvania Abortion
Control Act of 1982 should not be subject to heightened judicial review since
the provisions of the Act do not impose an "undue burden" on the abortion
decision); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,
463 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The 'unduly burdensome' standard is
particularly appropriate in the abortion context because of the nature and scope of
the right that is involved.").
174. Michelman, supra note 24, at 34.
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touching an abortion must be invalidated."1 75 She "dispute[s] ...
the legitimacy of the Court's attempt to discredit ... state abor-
tion regulation regardless of the interests it serves and the impact
it has."' 76 In Webster, Justice O'Connor did not budge from her
previously stated position that, during the previability period of
pregnancy, "a regulation imposed on a lawful abortion is not un-
constitutional unless it unduly burdens the right to seek an
abortion." 77
Justice O'Connor is prepared to narrate a story that is not
limited to the Court's precedents. 78 Her opinions contain co-
gent reasoning. She eschews misleading rhetoric about the right
to be let alone or the freedom not to conform. She is sensitive to
the plight of women who are not adequately respected as citizens
of their communities, and she understands that the pregnant wo-
man is usually in the best position to decide if she can bear the
responsibilities concomitant with bringing a fetus to term. Her
respect for the dignity of each individual can eventually give more
content and shape to the Court's concept of autonomy.
The open-ended concept of autonomy has to be defined and
clarified by the Court. Once a useful concept of moral and polit-
ical philosophy, courts now refer to autonomy in so many differ-
ent ways that its core meaning is no longer intelligible.
Autonomy is sometimes used to refer to an absolute right (legal
and moral) of persons to make their own decisions about any ar-
guably private matter without any interference by others. Auton-
omy is used somewhat differently in a psychological sense to
designate a fully functioning person. Kant's idea of autonomy is
much more restricted than the privacy notion embraced by con-
temporary liberals. The future usefulness of autonomy as a legal
concept depends on how it is integrated with responsible public
standards of responsible behavior.
Although the existentialist liberal defines autonomy as each
person's own creation, 79 not every pregnant woman's psycholog-
175. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 829 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
176. Id.
177. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3063 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment) (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 453).
178. Michelman, supra note 24, at 35.
179. J. RAZ, supra note 100, at 408. The notion of autonomy is a central
concept in moral and political philosophy and discussed by countless writers
including John Rawls, Robert P. Wolff, and Bruce Ackerman. See G. DWORKIN,
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988); see also B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980);J. RAWLS, A THEORY OFJUSTICE (1971); R.
WOLFF, IN DEFENSE OF ANARCHISM (1970).
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ical autonomy as a functioning person is seriously jeopardized by
abortion control laws. "The significance of [a state's] denial of
options [needed for] one's autonomy depends on the circum-
stances one finds oneself in."' 8i 0 If a state denies a woman an op-
tion dictated by her profound and clearly evident personal needs,
as opposed to whims, or her first choice of many available op-
tions, her psychological autonomy is seriously impaired. Reason-
able legislative compromises regulating abortion, however, do
not foreclose too many options if the legislature finds a middle
ground between extremely strict and extremely permissive posi-
tions, and is sensitive to the reasonable expectations of women.
Only a dogmatic, one-dimensional liberal could insist that all val-
ues and rights are subordinated to an unqualified absolute right
to reproductive freedom.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article has described liberalism's concern for the dignity
and integrity of free individuals and its revulsion for legal moral-
ism. While liberalism is a vital ingredient in American constitu-
tional law, it is not the whole story. According to venerable
notions of republicanism, state legislatures may impose their
political will if their concerns are important, comport with their
professed adherence to civic virtue, and are subject to ongoing
democratic re-evaluation. In such situations, a politically respon-
sible Supreme Court will be sensitive to and informed by the peo-
ple's dialogues-the building blocks of a legal system's
legitimacy.
In sum, absent demonstrable violations of the written Consti-
tution, this narrative generally supports greater judicial deference
to the political community's assessment of its members' common
good, particularly if its deference is compatible with an enduring
common sense understanding of civic virtue. History demon-
strates that no decision by a court of law will end the continuing
public debate about a political problem that has no ultimate or
permanent solution. The Court's role is to help people reach a
solution within constitutional boundaries and judges should
avoid becoming part of the problem. Concerning abortion, it is
submitted that a responsible individual is subject to reasonable
laws that deserve general acceptance after a fair and full debate.
A prohibition of abortion, however, is inconsistent with both lib-
180. J. RAZ, supra note 100, at 410.
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eralism and republicanism if it is the product of a systematically
distorted political process, subjects women to serious trauma,
pain or grief, or "sends a message to [women] that they are out-
siders, not fully members of the political community."''
181. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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